DRIVUNO vs the big clouds: the architecture, not the marketing

The single question that matters For any cloud you consider, ask: *can the provider technically read my files?* Everything else — pricing, integrations, UI polish — is secondary if the answer to that question is "yes" and your content is sensitive.

How the big clouds answer it Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, iCloud (default mode), WeTransfer and Slack all answer "yes". Not because they are malicious, but because their architecture requires it: server-side previews, full-text indexing, content scanning, account recovery, AI features. All of these need plaintext, and therefore keys controlled by the provider.

What that looks like in practice - A subpoena returns readable contents. - A breach can expose plaintext. - A staff member with the right access can technically read content. - Automated systems (scanning, classification, AI) operate on your files.

None of this is hidden — it is documented in each provider's transparency reports and security pages. The issue is not honesty; it is architecture.

How DRIVUNO answers it "No — by construction." Your password is stretched on your device with Argon2id. Each file gets a fresh symmetric key (XChaCha20-Poly1305) generated locally. The server only ever stores ciphertext. Public share links carry the key in the URL fragment, which never reaches the server.

When the big clouds are still the right tool Public marketing assets, throwaway temp files, team chat about non-sensitive topics — they work brilliantly. The architecture comparison only matters for the files that actually need to stay private: contracts, NDA work, medical records, financial documents, private photos, source code, IP.

The simple rule If a leak of the file would cost you money, reputation or a relationship, the key belongs with you — not with the provider. That is exactly what DRIVUNO provides, as the default and only mode of operation.