Private photo backup: what actually keeps your images private
Which technical properties genuinely protect a photo backup — and which reassuring features (TLS, at-rest encryption, compliance badges) do not change who can read it.
Try it in one click.
Three private surfaces. Same zero-knowledge architecture.
Sorting signal from reassurance Photo services advertise a lot of security. Only a few properties change who can read your images.
Does not change it: - TLS / "encrypted in transit" — protects the network path, not the destination - "Encrypted at rest" with provider-managed keys — protects stolen hardware - Compliance audits — describe process quality, not key custody - "We never sell your data" — a commercial promise, not a technical barrier - Two-factor authentication — protects your login, not the provider's access
Does change it: - Key derivation on the device with a memory-hard KDF - Per-item keys sealed with an authenticated cipher - Encrypted file names and EXIF - Share links whose key material never reaches the server - No provider-side password reset that restores data
Why 2FA is not the answer to this question Two-factor authentication is essential and you should enable it everywhere. It stops someone else from logging into your account. It does nothing about the fact that the provider's own systems can decrypt your library, because those systems never log in.
Why "we don't train AI on your photos" is not the answer either It is a policy statement about one use. The underlying capability — decryption — remains, and with it every other consequence: internal tooling, breach exposure, legal disclosure and future policy changes.
The five questions that give you the truth 1. Where is my master key generated, and with which KDF? 2. If I forget my password, can you restore my photos? 3. Are file names and EXIF encrypted, or only pixels? 4. When I share a link, what does your server receive? 5. What can you hand over in response to a valid legal request?
The answers that describe genuine private backup: on my device with Argon2id; no; both; no key material; ciphertext.
Availability is a separate problem Private does not mean safe from loss. A complete plan needs:
- the encrypted cloud copy for access and sync
- one offline encrypted copy, ideally off-site
- a tested recovery kit, stored physically, not in the same vault
- a periodic restore test — an untested backup is a hypothesis
What DRIVUNO does about both Confidentiality: Argon2id on the device, X25519 key wrapping, XChaCha20-Poly1305 payloads, encrypted names, blind-index search, 24-hour maximum link expiry.
Durability: encrypted snapshots replicated to independent EU storage with immutability windows, plus automatic failover between providers if one becomes unavailable. The backups are ciphertext too — we cannot read our own copies of your library.
Try it in one click.
Three private surfaces. Same zero-knowledge architecture.