Sharing a file should not mean sharing it with your provider.
Recipient-keyed envelopes, encrypted folder trees and expiring public links — all built so we hold no key that opens your data.
“Share widely. Trust narrowly.”
For teams and individuals who share sensitive material regularly and want cryptographic, not administrative, access control.
Built for confidentiality
Keys derived on device
Argon2id turns your passphrase into a master key locally. The server sees wrapped keys, never the master.
Recipient-keyed grants
Each grant seals the content key to a specific X25519 public key, so access is provable and revocable.
Folder-level access
Grant a whole encrypted folder, including future files, without exposing the rest of the vault.
Public links without server keys
Public shares put the decryption key in the URL fragment, which never reaches our infrastructure.
Search without plaintext
Blind-index HMAC tags let you find files by name without the server ever learning the name.
Verifiable architecture
Primitives, threat model and limitations are published rather than summarised as 'bank-level security'.
What zero-knowledge means here
It means our servers hold ciphertext and wrapped keys, and no process on our side can unwrap them. It does not mean we see nothing at all: we necessarily process account identifiers, membership, sizes and timestamps to operate the service. We publish exactly what that includes.
Access control that a database change cannot bypass
In a conventional cloud, permission is a row in a table; anyone who can edit that row can read the file. Here, permission is possession of a sealed key envelope. Editing a database row grants nothing readable.
Honest limitations
If you lose your passphrase and your recovery key, your data is unrecoverable — that is the direct consequence of the design. Endpoint security remains your responsibility: an attacker with a fully compromised, unlocked device sees what you see.
Frequently asked questions
Can DRIVUNO read our messages or files?
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No. Messages and files are encrypted on the device before they are sent. DRIVUNO Rooms seals every message with XChaCha20-Poly1305 under a room key that is itself wrapped per member with X25519. Servers relay and store ciphertext only.
How is this different from Slack or Microsoft Teams?
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Slack and Teams encrypt data in transit and at rest, but the provider holds the keys, so administrators, automated systems and legal requests can reach message content. DRIVUNO is designed so that this is technically impossible on our side: we never hold a key that opens your content.
What happens when someone leaves the team?
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Removing a member revokes their sealed copy of the room or folder key and triggers a key rotation, so future content is sealed under a key they never had.
Do you keep metadata?
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Only what is strictly required to operate: account identifiers, membership, timestamps, sizes and security/audit logs. File and channel names are encrypted; search runs on blind indexes (HMAC tags), not on plaintext.
Is there a free plan to test it?
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Yes. The free plan includes 1 GB with the exact same zero-knowledge architecture — encrypted drive, Rooms messaging and encrypted sharing.