Encryption happens in your browser or app before the upload starts. We store bytes we have no key for.
“If we are breached, compelled or mistaken, your files stay unreadable.”
For firms and teams storing client files, contracts, patient or financial data, source code and unreleased work in the cloud.
XChaCha20-Poly1305 payloads under keys derived on the device with Argon2id. No key ever reaches us in usable form.
Each Team Drive folder key is sealed individually to every member with X25519 and rotated when someone is removed.
Chunked, resumable after a crash or a dropped connection, and verified afterwards by sampling authenticated segments.
Names and tags are matched through HMAC indexes computed on your device — the server never sees plaintext.
Passphrase-gated public links, key material in the URL fragment only, expiring within 24 hours at most.
Hourly encrypted snapshots to independent immutable storage, with restore that has actually been tested.
Google Drive is operationally excellent and reads your content in order to be so: full-text search across documents, universal previews, thumbnails, scanning, real-time co-editing and assistant features all require plaintext on the server. We cannot offer those, because we cannot read your files. That is the trade, stated plainly.
Move confidential material first: client work, contracts, personal data, source code, unreleased product. Leave public and disposable material where it is convenient. Most teams find the confidential subset is smaller than expected and easy to isolate — and mixing the two is what makes privacy projects stall.
There is no password reset that restores data, because that would require a key on our side. Instead, every member generates a recovery kit to store offline, shared work lives in team folders keyed to more than one person, and encrypted snapshots to independent storage mean a provider incident never becomes a data-loss event.
No. Content is encrypted on your device before upload. Account keys are derived locally with Argon2id, room and folder keys are wrapped per member with X25519, and payloads are sealed with XChaCha20-Poly1305. Our servers store ciphertext and wrapped keys.
Transit and at-rest encryption use keys held by the provider, which is why server-side search, previews, scanning and administrative export are possible. Client-side encryption removes the provider from the set of parties able to read content.
Provider-side full-text search over document contents, universal server-generated previews, content AI on your data, administrative content export, and password resets that recover data. Search runs on device-side blind indexes and recovery relies on a recovery kit you keep offline.
Removal revokes their sealed copy of the room or folder key and triggers rotation, so future content is sealed under a key they never held.
Public links carry key material in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit to a server, are gated by a passphrase and expire within 24 hours at most. Links can be revoked earlier and view counts capped.
No, and most teams should not. Move the confidential surface first — client work, matters, deals, personal data, unreleased product — and keep general coordination where it is until the pilot proves out.
Start free with 1 GB. Zero-knowledge encryption from the first upload — no admin override, no AI scanning, no plaintext on the server.
